












































Compensatingf fo or rWhen the Energy Employees Occupational Illness Compensation Program
Act (EEOICPA) became law on 30 October 2000, it was widely regarded as a landmark
piece of legislation. After years of fighting workers’ claims of occupational illness in court, the government had
decided to acknowledge its responsibility for decades of unsafe working conditions in Cold War nuclear
weapons factories. The law promised a lump sum payment of $150,000 plus medical benefits in compensation
to individual workers or families of workers who had developed job-related illnesses. 
However, another challenge lay ahead: how to equitably award the payments to the deserving workers. To do
so, government administrators have developed a mathematical model using information about cancer risks from
radiation exposure to determine which claims are likely to be job-related. However, the precise numerical results
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cbelie numerous assumptions and uncer-
tainties, and the details of the plan have
generated substantial debate.
The Equity Dilemma
Over a 50-year period from the late 1940s to
the 1990s, the U.S. Department of Energy
(DOE) and its contractors employed over
600,000 men and women at various sites in
the production of nuclear weapons. These
workers were exposed to a variety of radia-
tion sources, including radon and X rays.
The government had long denied that the
working conditions could lead to disease, but
that position finally changed in early 2000.
Bill Richardson, energy secretary at the time,
in announcing an early version of the com-
pensation plan for workers, said that “the
government is done fighting workers, and
now we’re going to help them.” 
Responsibility for administering the
EEOICPA’s compensation program was
assigned by President Clinton to the U.S.
Department of Labor (DOL). Normally
such duties would have been under the
purview of the U.S. Department of Justice
(DOJ), which oversees several other major
compensation schemes including, for exam-
ple, the September 11 Victim Compensation
Fund, the National Vaccine Injury
Compensation Program, and the Radiation
Exposure Compensation Act, which com-
pensates residents of Utah and Nevada
exposed to radioactive fallout from nuclear
testing. But worker advocates argued that in
this case the agency had a conflict of interest
because of its role in defending the govern-
ment against worker claims. 
Funds are appropriated for the program
each year. For fiscal year 2002 the program
received $597 million for benefits and $136
million for administration. But the legislation
is written so that payments cannot be denied
because of lack of funds in the DOL budget. 
The EEOICPA provides compensation
for illnesses related to three hazardous occu-
pational exposures: radiation, beryllium, and
silica. The victims of beryllium and silica
exposure are relatively easy to identify,
because they develop diseases specific to expo-
sure to those agents. Beryllium is a light,
highly rigid metal that withstands heat well
and is used in nuclear weapons components.
Some workers who were exposed to beryllium
developed chronic beryllium disease, a disease
of the lungs. Workers who mined tunnels in
Nevada and Alaska for underground nuclear
tests were exposed to silica dust, which causes
chronic silicosis (nonmalignant lung disease). 
But identifying the radiation victims is
not so easy. The EEOICPA limits claims to
victims who have developed cancer. This
includes all types of cancer except chronic
lymphocytic leukemia, which is not believed
to be caused by radiation. But cancer is a
common disease, even among those who have
never gone near a nuclear weapons plant, and
it is likely that many of the nuclear workers
will develop cancers that are not job-related.
Compensation administrators are left with a
daunting challenge—how to decide who
deserves to be compensated.
There is no foolproof test to determine
whether a worker’s lung cancer was caused
by radiation or by, say, cigarette smoke. In
occupational injury disputes involving can-
cer, administrators and courts are forced to
rely on probabilities. Nicholas Ashford, a
professor of technology and policy at the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology,
explains that, in such cases, decisions are





which is largely statis-
tical evidence.” In
other words, a doctor
cannot identify the




and the patient’s radiation exposure can
determine whether it is likely that the cancer
was caused by radiation.
The EEOICPA requires that compensa-
tion for cancer be granted only if the disease
is “at least as likely as not related to employ-
ment.” This translates into a probability of
50% or greater, a cutoff that has been used
in other compensation systems and in tort
law. The principle here is that some individ-
uals’ cancers are more likely to be job-related
than others, depending on how much radia-
tion exposure they received, their age, and
other factors. While the DOL will oversee
the compensation program, the National
Institute for Occupational Safety and Health
(NIOSH) was charged with developing a sci-
entifically based model to assign to each
claimant a probability that his or her disease
is job-related. 
Models and Assumptions
The centerpiece of the NIOSH final rule
on the probability of causation in radiation
workers, which was promulgated on 2 May
2002, is a computer program known as the
Interactive Radio-Epidemiological Program
(IREP). The IREP was originally developed
by the National Cancer Institute (NCI) to
aid the Department of Veterans Affairs in
adjudicating claims of atomic veterans
(U.S. veterans exposed to radiation from a
nuclear blast in World War II or during
nuclear bomb tests during the Cold War),
but NIOSH made some modifications in
adapting it for the nuclear workers. 
While the NIOSH–IREP model contains
some highly technical bells and whistles, the
basic calculation relies on one crucial piece of
data: for any given radiation dose, how much
does it increase a worker’s risk of developing a
particular type of cancer? The program con-
tains a large database of cancer risk estimates
for different types of cancer based on type of
radiation, dose, sex, history of smoking, age
at exposure, and age at which the cancer was
diagnosed. However, these estimates of low-
level radiation risk have been the subject of
ongoing scientific controversy.
The NCI group that developed the origi-
nal IREP model, led by radiation statistician
Charles Land, primarily relied upon studies
of 82,000 Japanese atomic bomb survivors,
the richest data source available, to generate
the risk model. However, some scientists have
questioned the application of the Japanese
survivor studies to American nuclear workers.
While the Japanese at Hiroshima and
Nagasaki were exposed to a single intense
blast of radiation, the nuclear workers were
exposed to smaller doses, sometimes over a
period of decades, which, some experts say,
could result in different biologic effects. Says
epidemiologist David Richardson of the
School of Public Health at the University of
North Carolina at Chapel Hill (UNC), “The
question is whether [the cancer risk values]
are valid, and the validity is partly a question
of extrapolating from a bomb blast to chronic
exposures. That’s probably the main source of
uncertainty.”
Richardson argues that the risk model
should also incorporate findings from studies
in U.S. nuclear workers. In a study published
in the August 1999 issue of EHP, Richardson
and UNC colleague Steve Wing studied
14,000 Cold War workers at Oak Ridge
National Laboratory and found substantially
higher cancer risks at low-level exposures than
would have been predicted based on data
from the atomic bomb survivors study.
(Wing published an earlier paper on this
same topic with similar results in the 20
March 1991 issue of the Journal of the
American Medical Association.)
But results from other worker studies
have been inconsistent. Other scientists main-
tain that because most workers are exposed to
very low levels of radiation, it is difficult to
distinguish between a small adverse effect and
no effect at all. “The worker studies have a lot
less information than the survivor studies,”
says statistician Daniel Stram of the
University of Southern California.
Most radiation scientists do agree, how-
ever, that the same radiation dose has a dif-
ferent effect when it is given over a longer
time interval. Says John Boice, scientific
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sdirector of the International Epidemiology
Institute and a member of the International
Commission on Radiological Protection,
“There’s a wealth of animal and cellular and
biological data that indicate that if you
spread the dose over time, the effect is less.”
This is because human DNA is able to
repair small amounts of damage. 
In predicting risks for long-term expo-
sures, major radiation protection organiza-
tions such as the National Council on
Radiation Protection and Measurements, a
nongovernmental group of radiation and
health experts, recommend using a correction
factor called a dose rate effectiveness factor
(DREF). This factor represents how much
the effectiveness of a dose of radiation
decreases when it is given over a long time
period (as a slower dose rate). A higher DREF
number means that exposure over a longer
time will be much less effective than the same
exposure over a short time. The council (as
well as other radiation protection authorities)
suggests that the correct number to be used
here is somewhere between 2 and 10, but
they settled on 2 as the most prudent choice
because it assumes the highest risk. Yet the
appropriate value of this correction factor is
uncertain. William Beckner, executive direc-
tor of the council, says, “That number is
based on a scientific judgment; it’s not based
on scientific data that it is a number of two.” 
NIOSH has adopted the recommended
correction factor in their risk valuation
model, though the agency has received criti-
cism from both sides of the debate for doing
so. Richardson and Wing maintain that their
worker studies contradict the theory that a
dose given over a longer time is less effective,
and suggest that no correction is necessary. At
the other extreme, Harvard physics professor
and radiation expert Richard Wilson advo-
cates for an even stronger correction factor.
“Whoever chose the dose rate [effectiveness]
factors was an extreme pessimist,” he says. 
Nevertheless, there is broad agreement





vides a range of pos-
sible values to reflect
this uncertainty, and
the EEOICPA requires that administrators
use the value most favorable to the worker.
Says Larry Elliott, director of the NIOSH
Office of Compensation Analysis and
Support, “We give the benefit of the doubt
to the claimant, using science to the fullest
extent possible in doing so.” 
The Politics of Compensation
Land insists that the model works exactly as
intended. “If you are not compensated,” he
says, “it must be just about impossible not to
have had a probability of causation less than
fifty percent. It’s an extremely generous stan-
dard of proof.”  
But worker advocates maintain that
inequities persist. For instance, the
NIOSH–IREP model treats smokers differ-
ently than nonsmokers when considering
claims for lung cancer, imposing more strin-
gent requirements for compensation. Knut
Ringen is a consultant who provided public
comment to NIOSH on the proposed com-
pensation rule on behalf of the Center to
Protect Workers’ Rights, part of the AFL-
CIO based in Silver Spring, Maryland. He is
concerned that because 80% of the workers
were smokers, very few will be eligible for
compensation for lung cancer. “On one level
this makes sense, but it leads to a totally
absurd result,” he says. “A smoker has to
have up to thirty times the exposure in order
to get the same compensation as a nonsmok-
er. We think that’s just plain wrong.”
Ultimately, some critics would like to
see the burden of proof rest on the govern-
ment, not on the worker. For example,
physicist Marvin Resnikoff of Waste
Management Associates, a New York City
consulting company that provides dose esti-
mates and other technical information on
behalf of workers in litigation, opposes the
requirement for exposure estimation. “They
shift the burden on the workers to deter-
mine what these levels are,” he says. “The
presumption should be that there was stuff
in the air and that the workers were
exposed.” 
Indeed, the greatest uncertainty in adju-
dicating claims comes not from the scientific
debate about radiation risks but from the
lack of adequate records of worker exposures.
Record-keeping practices for radiation safety
were woefully deficient at many sites, partic-
ularly for intermittent and temporary work-
ers such as those doing construction and
maintenance work. NIOSH will do the work
of dose reconstruction itself, based on DOE
records and interviews with workers, accord-
ing to a second final rule released at the same
time. Exposures will have to be estimated
based on job descriptions and measurements
from comparable work settings. However, in
some cases, the records may be so poor as to
prevent any realistic estimation.
James Melius, a member of the Advisory
Board on Radiation and Worker Health,
which provides oversight of NIOSH’s rule
making under the EEOICPA, maintains that
missing records pose a major challenge.
Administrators will be forced to strike a bal-
ance between scientific accuracy and expedi-
ence, he says: “How far do you go in trying
to find dose information or to reconstruct? I
think that is a key issue. It may cost more
just to do that than to award compensation.”
The EEOICPA does provide for excep-
tions when exposure records are especially
poor. The law singles out workers at a few
notorious sites, including the gaseous diffu-
sion plants at Paducah (Kentucky), Ports-




have to show that
they worked in an
exposed job for at
least 250 days. Under
the EEOICPA, additions to the special
exposure cohorts can be created for groups
of workers where the radiation dose cannot
be determined “with sufficient accuracy.”
NIOSH is still working on developing
guidelines by which it will make these
determinations. 
The Advisory Board on Radiation and
Worker Health will be a key player in all of
this. The board provides independent
advice to NIOSH with members reflecting
“a balance of scientific, medical, and worker
perspectives.” Currently, though, the 12-
member advisory board includes only one
worker as well as one labor union physician.
In February, advisory board chairman Paul
Ziemer wrote to Department of Health and
Human Services secretary Tommy
Thompson asking that this imbalance be
rectified, but so far no other workers have
been added. The next advisory board meet-
ing, to be held in Denver on 1–2 July 2002,
will be the first held outside Washington,
D.C., and board members hope that this
will allow more input from former workers. 
So far about $200 million has been paid
out, mostly to uranium miners and members
of the special exposure cohorts. About 4,000
cancer claims are currently awaiting assess-
ment by the NIOSH–IREP model, after
which they will forwarded to the DOL for a
final decision. While the NIOSH rule pre-
scribing the compensation model is now
final, it allows for revisions to the
NIOSH–IREP model under the oversight of
the advisory board. Thus, disputes over the
modeling assumptions are likely to continue. 
However, Stram is quick to point out
that, despite scientific differences, a lot is
known about how to calculate radiation risks.
“We probably know more about radiation
than we do about any other exposure,” he
says. “Despite all of the uncertainties, we
know that there is a bound on the risks.”
That may be small compensation to workers
who fail the probability test and are left with
the legacy of cancer.
Mark J. Parascandola
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